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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with Time magazine's coverage of the host-
age crisis in Iran. It sought to determine if the Time magazine's cov-
erage of the crisis was b~ .. B:nd fair to both parties - the 
government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the American government. 
The writer is from Iran and was concerned with the c()v:e.r.age__rg_£_~_iyed_.bL_ 
the Jr:Ci!l.~an government. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The American involvement in Iran since the early 1930s, the reign 
of the Shah, and the growing discontent of the Iranian people have been 
a focus of attention in the U.S. media. Every instrument of journalism 
has followed closely the development of issues and increase in friction 
at every stage. But the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the 
capture of Embassy officials as hostages brought events to a climax, 
drawing worldwide attention in its wake. 
The writer believes that a study of how one major publication -
board for discussing matters more clearly. 
Time magazine is chosen for several reasons. It is one of the 
leading magazines in the nation with more than 50 ygars of news-gather-
ing experience. Its readership is not limited to the U.S. but extends 
worldwide. The writer believes that coverage by Time was more extensive 
than any other national news magazine. For this analysis every article -1( 
1 
' 
' related to Iran and the hostage crisis between the period October 1970 / 
and February 1981 will be utilized. 
To those not familiar with Iran or the crisis, it would be helpful 
if some background information is furnished. Certain pertinent details 
regarding history, culture, and geography of Iran provide a helpful 
backdrop for this study. 
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Iran is bounded on the north by the Caspian Sea and the Transcau-
casian and Turkistan territories of the U.S.S.R.; on the east by 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the south are the Persian Gulf and Arabian 
Seas; and on the west, Iraq and Turkey. 
The period of history of contemporary interest actually started in 
1925 when Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, succeeded to 
the throne of Iran by a vote of the Iranian Parliament and a constitu-
tional amendment, thus becoming the Shah of Iran. He established the 
Pahlavi dynasty and singlehanded, absolute rule, but retained the 
Constitution of 1906 and its symbol of expression, and the Parliament as 
a source of legitimacy for his actions. 
His reign was well summarized by Saikal when he wrote: 
He ruled his strategically and economically important Islamic 
Kingdom with absolute authority, and spent its enormous oil 
income as he saw fit. His publicly avowed goal was to trans-
form Iran into a progressive, pro-Western, self-sustaining 
industrial and military power.1 
Until 1940 Iran had a very small place in the arena of American 
foreign policy. The United States had neither significant military and 
economic interests in Iran, nor were there many Iranian voters, compared 
to those of other ethnic groups, in the United States. 
But the American viewpoint of Iran changed drastically, beginning 
in 1940. In the early 1940s a report was submitted to President 
Franklin Roosevelt by an American commission of experts, which stated 
that the center of gravity of the world's petroleum output was shifting 
to the Persian Gulf. 
It gradually dawned on a number of American policy-makers that if 
1Arnin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (New Jersey, 1980), 
p. 3. 
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Iran fell to Soviet communism, all Western economic and political inter-
est in the Persian Gulf region would become vulnerable to Soviet penetra-
tion. 
In the context of reports and the existence of a potential threat 
of Soviet interference in Iran, the American government began to esta-
blish closer relations with Reza Shah. 
Washington committed itself to the development of close polit-
ical, economic, and military ties with Iran, so that America's 
position would remain strong in the country. It bolstered 
its military mission in Iran by dispatching additional mili-
tary experts and advisors to the Iranian government. It 
sought access to the country's oil resources.2 
Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son in 1941. He went into exile 
in South Africa, where he died in 1944. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, only 20 
years old, became the Shah of Iran. 
It took the Shah a few years to return the country to normal. He 
had to fight the growing social disorder, political disarray, and econo-
mic hardship. 
The Shah's goals at this time were stated by Avery, thus: 
The Shah began his new term of office with the announcement 
that he would cleanse the existing administrative machinery 
of the nepotism, inefficiency and corruption with which he 
found it 'riddled'. The Shah was not prepared to allow a 
variety of forces to join together and unseat him.3 
U.S. Senator, Hubert Humphrey, put it this way in 1960: "Do you 
know what the head of the Iranian army told one of our people? He said 
the army was in good shape. Thanks to U.S. aid it was now capable of 
coping with the civilian population."4 
2Ibid, p. 31 
3Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York, 1965), p. 451. 
4Fred Hallidy, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York, 
1979)' p. 252. 
The U.S.A. acquired an extremely convenient base area along the 
southern borders of the Soviet Union. 
Halliday summed up American involvement thus: 
The U.S.A. has been the key external factor in Iranian foreign 
policy since the second World War. Iran gradually became part 
of what is called 'the North Tier' -- the line of pro-Western 
states along the southern borders of the Soviet Union, from 
Turkey to Pakistan.S 
Aid from the U.S.A. was not·limited to military supplies and per-
sonnel. 
Under its various programs and agencies, the United States "pro-
vided the regime, from 1953 to 1957 alone, with a total of $366.8 mil-
lion in economic-financial aid. The inflow of such aid cont~nued at an 
average of $45 million a year for the next three years.6 
5 
This extensive American involvement in Iran brought with it a great 
increase in Western social and cultural influence, particularly among 
those educated urban Iranians who found the Shah's regime and its pro-
Western stance desirable and beneficial. 
At the same time it brought with it crushing force wiping out any 
form of internal dissension against the Shah. The military and the 
secret police, (SAVAK) executed, imprisoned, and exiled hundreds, almost 
indiscriminately. 
The brutal intervention of the military in the political 
sphere became a pervasive characteristic of the Shah's rule. 
The military and SAVAK were used effectively in crushing and 
demoralizing opposition of all political coloring, manipulat.-
ing the behavior of citizens, and controlling and redirect-
ing public opinion for the benefit of the regime's stability 
and security.7 
sibid., p. 75. 
6saikal, p. 51. 
7Ibid., p. 62. 
6 
Toward the end of 1960, the Shah's regime became unpopular. The 
regime enforced strict press censorship, and warned the press against 
any criticism of the royal family, or the military, or the Americans, 
whose support was crucial for the Shah to continue his political repres-
sion. 
There were enormous, often violent, mass demonstrations a-
gainst the regime from 1960, which continued over the next 
three years and demonstrated the displeasure of a sizeable 
portion of the Iranian people with regime's behavior and 
with the discouraging social and economic conditions. Those 
displeased with the state of affairs comprised nonpartisan 
students, intellectuals, professionals, craftsmen, small 8 
businessmen, landowners, religious leaders, and tribesmen. 
At this time, there rose to prominence a religious figure -
Ayatollah Rohollah Khomeini. 
thus: 
Elson summed up Khomeini' s. influence over the Iranian public, 
The impact of the Ayatollah on world events is far greater 
than merely the hostage crisis. Khomeini has. ignited a mes-
sianic fervor to destroy Western influence that may spread 
throughout the Arab world, and a xenophobic nationalism th~t 
could be exported even to non-Islamic Third World nations. 
Khomeini was chosen as the "Man of the Year'' by Time magazine, in 
its January 7, 1980~issue. He was relatively unknown to the world in 
I 
1960. At that time he came into prominence when he began issuing public 
statements in opposition to the Shah's "oppressive" rule and some of 
the government reforms. He opposed, for example, the government's 
program of female emancipation as contrary to Islam. 
Khomeini was exiled in 1964 as a part of the Shah's actions to 
crush the growing uprising against the government. For almost 15 years 
8 Ibid • , p • 64 • 
9John A. Meyers, "A Letter from the Publisher," Time (Jan. 7, 1980), 
p. 3. 
7 
he lived in Baghdad, Iraq. When thie uprisings began in 1978 against the 
Shah, Khomeini left Iraq and went to Paris. On February 1, 1980 - 14 
days after the Shah left Iran - Khomeini returned. 
The writer believes that a brief summary of the significant devel-
opments between 1964 and 1978 will serve as a backdrop for the Iranian 
revolution and the role Khomeini played in it. 
To regain some of his lost popularity and to subdue those agitating 
for better social and economic conditions, the Shah launched the "White 
Revolution" on January 26, 1963. 
Saikal describes the need for it, thus: 
The Shah declared that 'Iran's internal situation and inLer-
national position' made him feel 'an empirical need' for a 
revolution and based on the most advanced principles of jus-
tice and human rights that would change the framework of 
society and make it comparable to that of most developed 
countries in the world.10 
He introduced several land reforms to improve the condition of the 
peasant. 
Lenczowski describes the land reforms: 
The primary objects of land reforms were to destroy the power 
of the large landowners and improve the condition of the vil-
lager. Additional reforms dealt with the politically and so-
cially delicate question of the consolidation of parcels of 
land into economic units.11 
In this period the status of women rose steadily. The Shah started 
the process of emancipation of women by decreeing that girls should 
receive an education, and by ordering that the "achador" - the tradi-
tional dress worn by women - be no longer worn. He also gave them the 
10 Saikal, p. 79. 
11George Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis 
p. 109. 
(Chicago: 1978), 
right to vote. 
In 1967, legislation was passed to prevent a man from marry-
ing a second wife unless the first agreed. In 1974, the 
minimum legal age for marriage was raised from 16 to 18. The 
emancipation of women has meant a great upsurge of concern 
for social welfare.l2 
8 
For the pasture lands, the government legislated that "public own-
ership" be available to sheep and cattlemen, and canceled all the 
charges that had been collected in the past by private owners. It sub-
sequently nationalized water resources. The nationalization of water, 
which came into effect in July 1968, supported both agricultural and 
industrial development. It made water utilization more efficient and 
increased the water supply, so that there would be enough water avail-
able for the expanding agriculture, industry, arid electric power. 
Concurrently with land reform, the White Revolution's program 
stressed the rapid industrialization of Iran and improvement in the 
working and living conditions of the country's industrial labor force. 
It sought direct investment to establish heavy industries, such as steel 
and petrochemicals; it promoted, together with private investment, light 
industries, such as the manufacture of refrigerators, heaters, and 
assembly factories for motor vehicles, radios, and the like; and it 
sought to protect and strengthen traditional industries, such as tex-
tiles, carpets, and food processing. 
The Shah declared "National Reconstruction" to be a necessary fol-
low-up of these reforms, involving the reconstruction of both urban 
centers and rural areas. By the late 1960s, the government legislated 
urban renewal and urban reconstruction acts. 
12Ibid., p. 116. 
9 
Saikal describes the National Reconstruction reform and sums up its 
objectives: 
It was to narrow the gap in the standards of living between 
the cities and villages; to eliminate discrimination among 
various areas through greater attention to less developed 
areas; to accelerate rural development ·and reconstruction; 
and to continue with urban renewal; and to introduce all 
modern amenities for transforming Iran into a prosperous 
and powerful country in its region.13 
The Shah failed to couple these socio-economic reforms with any 
major reform toward political democracy. He left the political struc-
ture and machinery under his supervision almost intact, and continued 
to centralize politics under his absolute control to strengthen his 
traditionally central position in Iranian politics. In gene~al, the 
Iranian people were still denied basic political freedoms and civil 
liberties. The.people were allowed neither to criticize government 
policies nor to seek redress for their grievances, individually or col-
lectively. 
The Shah magnified the scope and accelerated the implementation of 
his economic and military policies on the understanding that such reve-
nue increases would continue for at least the next decade. He declared 
that the overriding objective of his policies was to transform Iran 
into a non-oil, self-generating industrial and military power by the 
mid-1980s. 
But the Shah's over-all policies of accelerated economic industrial 
and military build-up soon proved to be beyond Iran's capacity to absorb 
at the rate envisaged by the Shah. 
By the end of 1975, after two years of high government spend-
ing, heavy importation of advanced industrial and military 
13Ibid. , p. 89. 
capital goods, and increased foreign investment, Iran was con-
fronted with a serious shortage of trained manpower and an 
abundance of technological, infrastructural, and administra-
tive bottlenecks, as well as a spiralling inflation, a drop in 
its agricultural production, and social imbalances.14 
10 
By 1977, Iran's general economic and social situation appeared grim.· 
A large elite of about 15 to 20 percent of the population, who benefited 
most from the oil wealth, the Shah's policies and their consequent 
opportunities, and who formed the upper social strata, led an amazingly 
lavish and extravagant Western life style. The remainder, who made up 
the lower social strata, lived largely in impoverished conditions, en-
vious of those with wealth, but struggling to improve their own social 
conditions and fulfill their rising expectations in whatever way pas-
sible. 
By 1977, amid growing economic and social difficulties, the polit-
ical structure became a major source of worry for the Shah. 
The Shah found it necessary to make some moves in order to 'lib-
eralize' the political system to some extent. He permitted a 
degree of guarded criticism by the government-controlled press, 
some members of the Parliament, and certain key officials of 
the government'. s execution of his policies. The SAVAK was in-
structed not to persecute and torture dissidents to the extent 
it had previously.15 
The liberalization measures soon proved to be very limited, too 
late, and ineffective in easing the situation. The measures opened the 
way for the various opposition groups that had hitherto been suppressed 
to rally public support against the Shah's rule. By early 1978, a 
series of demonstrations were held in the major Iranian cities. 
With these demonstrations started a period of aggression against 
14saikal, p. 183. 
15saikal, p. 192. 
11 
the Shah. By mid-1978, the demonstrations developed into a nationwide 
anti-Shah movement. The catch words of the agitators were "down with 
the Shah and his oppressive and corrupt rule," and "long live Khomeini, 
Islam, democracy, freedom, and equality." 
Khomeini now became the force behind the revolution. From Paris 
he publicized his views on the revolution through the Western press. 
Church describes Khomeini's role thus: 
Khomeini was the symbol of the revolution. Arrogant and pious. 
Stubborn and vengeful. Humorless and inflexible. Ascetic and 
power hungry. These are some of the adjectives that experts 
on Iran use to describe Khomeini. When he called for strikes, 
his followers shvt down the banks, thepostal service, the oil 
wells, bringing the country close to paraly"sis.16 
The Shah left Iran for a long vacation with his wife and proceeded 
to Aswan Egypt. This departure on January 16, 1979, was believed to be 
permanent. "It was generally agreed in domestic and· foreign circles 
that the Iranian monarch, who had ruled his country for 37 years, had 
17 departed for a long and perhaps permanent exile." 
The Shah left the nation's affairs to Premier Shahpur Bakhtair. 
The Parliament approved on January 16, the civilian cabinet of Bakhtiar. 
Bakhtiar's authority was immediately challenged by Khomeini. On 
January 13, 1979, he announced the formation of the Council of the 
Islamic Revolution, which he contended, would pave the way for a transi-
tional government to replace Bakhtiar. Khomeini urged his followers in 
Iran to continue their general strikes and demonstrations against the 
Bakhtiar government. 
16 George·Church, "Portrait of an Ascetic Despot," Time (Jan. 7, 
1980)' p. 22. 
17
"world Affairs," Facts on File (Jan. 19, 1979), p. 25. 
I 
12 
Several resignations in Bakhtiar's government followed the protests. 
Finally, Bakhtiar, in the face of strong protest against his government, 
left Iran on February 11, 1979. 
On April 1, Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic. This followed a nationwide referendum held March 30-31. Of 
18 million who voted in the referendum, 97 percent of the electorate 
had endorsed the Islamic Republic. 
Mehdi Bazargan, a revolutionary chosen by Khomeini, headed the 
country till November 5, 1979. He served as prime minister. 
Meanwhile, the Shah,proceeded from country to country seeking 
asylum. After spending five days in Egypt, he arrived in Marrakesh, 
Horocco on January 23, 1979. 
On March 30, 1979, the Shah and his family left Morocco and flew 
to the Bahamas where he stayed till June 9. 
On June 10, 1979, the ~hah flew to Mexico and landed in Mexico 
City. He was granted a six-month tourist visa. While in Mexico, the 
Shah's health worsened. Doctors in Mexico told him his condition 
required advanced medical care available only in the U.S. 
On October 22, the Shah proceeded to New York for medical treatment. 
He underwent surgery in New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center and was 
reported to be suffering from cancer of the lymph nodes. 
The U.S. Department said entry was granted because of the 
'significant deterioration in his health in recent days.' 
Washington reportedly stressed to the Iranian government 
that the Sh~h's entry was temporary and for medical treat-
ment only. 1 ~ 
On December 15, 1979, the Shah left the U.S. for Panama. In Panama 
18
"world Affairs," Facts on File (Nov. 9, 1979), p. 843. 
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the Shah's health deteriorated and his personal doctors said he was in 
need of hazardous surgery. But the operation was delayed until his con-
dition stabilized. A dispute arose between the Shah's aides and Pana-
manian doctors as to where and by whom the operation was to be conducted. 
The ailing Shah then left his exile in Panama on March 23, 1980, 
and arrived in Cairo, Egypt, where the late Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat granted him permanent asylum. 
In Cairo, the Shah's health deteriorated further. On June 27, 1980, 
he was admitted to an Egyptian military hospital near Cairo. The cancer 
that had been consuming him for several years finally took its toll. 
The Shah of Iran died on July 27, 1980. 
On the Shah's death, the late President Sadat said: "Let history 
judge the reign of the Shah as ruler, but we, in Islamic Egypt, will 
remain loyal to ethics and faithful to humane values. It was our duty 
to stand by him during hard times.n19 
On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was taken over by a 
group of Iranian students. The 60 hostages included political officers, 
Marine code clerks, and secretaries. The take over was preceded by dem~ 
onstrations outside the embassy the same morning. 
On Sunday hundreds of protesters gathered in downtown Tehran 
outside the U.S. embassy, a 27-acre compound surrounded by 
ten- and twelve-foot brick walls and secured with metal gates. 
The students, most of whom were unarmed, chanted anti-Ameri-
can slogans and carried banners: DEATH TO AMERICA IS A 
BEAUTIFUL THOUGHT and GIVE US THE SHAH.20 
A detailed account of the take over was provided by Time magazine 
its November 19 issue. 
19
"world Affairs", Facts on File (Aug. 1, 1980), p. 571. 
20"Blackmailing the U.S.," Time (Nov. 19, 1979), p. 17. 
I~ 
14 
Just before 11 a.m., some one with a pair of powerful shears man-
aged to break the chain that held the gates together. Once inside the 
compound, some headed for the ambassador's residence. Others tried to 
take over the chancellery, but found it protected with armor plating and 
grillwork. Inside the two-story, brick chancellery building, known to 
Americans as "Fort Apache" for its special security reinforcements, 
Marine guards donned flak jackets, and gas masks and ordered everyone to 
the top floor. Finally, aft~r stalling as long as possible, a Marine 
opened the door and students rushed in. Then they blindfolded the em-
21 bassy staff, bound their hands and made them sit on a corridor floor. 
With this began a long period of negotiations between American and 
Iranian officials that lasted for more than a year. 
At this point, the reasons for th~ takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran on November 4, 1979, by militant students must be clearly stated. 
The U.S. failed to meet several demands made by the Iranians led 
by Khomeini. The chief reason for the takeover was U.S. refusal to re-
turn the Shah and his wealth. 
The Ayatollah, who gave his blessing to the capture, has made 
a demand for the hostages' release: that the u.s. return de-
posed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Iran for trial and no 
doubt execution.22 
The purpose of this study was to examine the content of Time maga-
zine during the events that followed. The 444 days from November 4, 
1979)\ to January 20, 198~ have become history - the hostage crisis. 
J ) 
21Ibid., p. 19. 
22 Church, p. 9. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
-Message content is an important ingredient in the process of commu-
--
nication. Content represents the "portable world" with which one person 
or group communicates with another. Content analysis is a scientific 
method for analyzing various aspects of message content. Content analy-
sis has been used to answer questions such as these: 
How can communications suspected of subversion be tested for 
their 'propaganda' components? What makes writing readable? 
What are the.~~garities and 4.i:fferenc.e.s_j_n_th~J~t!-_tical {i 
symbols which come to the attention of people in the major 
power states? What intelligence data can be secured from 
analysis of enemy propaganda?! 
Content analysis procedures have developed greatly since 1952, when 
Bern~~on reviewed and codified the procedure in his book on con-
·- -
tent analysis. Kerling~J: defined this method of analysis as follows: 
__ _., . ..--
Content analysis, while certainly a method of analysis, is 
more than that. It is a method of observation .. Instead of 
observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to re-
spond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes 
the communications that people have produced and asks ques-
tions of the communications .2 .... ___ .... ~~····-·-··--
I 
This study involved analysis of selected messages by Time magazine. 
Messages about a news event may be handled in different ways by different 
rvrii'ernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research J 
(New York~ 1971), p. 14. 
2Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, Content Anal-
ysis of Communications (New York, 1967), p. 2. 
15 
16 
communicators or media. Some produce~ngthy messages. Others produce 
short messages, and still others may produce no messages at all. Some 
------
may select one part of the event to report and others another part. ---.:.....;.;.~_;;..--......... . . ........................ ~- ,_... .......................................... - .. -
Some may display the messages prominently; others may place them in lo-
'·-----~ ... -~~-.~-- ..... ,.. .• -y._ ........ ---··--·· ,,,,_., .•. ~.~·------- c:;_·-------~--~~---·--.,.,-~ •4··-••·'~""'''' -~-·· •' ., ., .. •· •' -···•·•••·•-•"·•••••·"'"'v"•-••--
cations where they are likely to a!_!E~.~ .. !. .. !.!.:~J;!~ ... !!t.t.~nti.Pn. 
This content study involved symbol analysis. In symbol analysis, 
the investigator seeks to describe some attitude or attitudes. We 
~ . 
chose symbols that described the attitudes. Their fre~~C::Y. 9.~ .. 2.f£.Yr-
renc~_!n the _content of the me~§l!'!g~ __ W.?..§ tabulated. 
____ .... -.,-·-· --·-·· "" ... - -
Coding usually involves directional analysis - that is, noting 
whether the s~ given~vorabl~ or unfavorable _treat-
ment - and the symbols may also be studied over time to deter-
'iiirrie-~ges in attention and _t_1:'_~-~1!.1!~nt given a part:!:.£~J-_cg:, 
symbol.~ 
Regardless of the specific method of content analysis, the investi-
gator has to question r~~!.~_P.g~.!Y. I_I~:_ .. ~!tllPle term~..! reliability mean~----
rep~~-~.i':'?.~.!.~~y .. with .. £QIJ,.$.;i,$ten.c.y .o£ ..... rgmtl_~ Ana ther definition of 
reliability was provided by Janis, Fadner, and Janowitz: 
For purposes of content.analysis, we define reliability as the 
degree of C.£!'.!.~§p_()_J:l_c!~n~ p~:tw.een .two.......ge.ts .. o.f .. .f.r.eq.uenc.ie.S-O.f. 
Ciass'frfe-cf symbol data based on the results of analysis of the 
same communications by two independent groups of analysts.4 
According to Stempel, reliability in content analysis is a problem 
that the individual researcher must solve to his own satisfaction within 
the limits of his study design and resources.5 
Errors most likely to bear on reliability are._!andom rather than 
3rbid., p. 64. 
I 
I 
4rrving L. Janis, "The Reliability ofa Content Analysis Technique," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1943), p. 292. 
5Guido H. Stempel, "Increasing Reliability in Content Analysis," 
Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Fall 1955), p. 10. 
I 
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constant errors. 
A method to correct errors was provided by Budd, Thorp, and Donohew: 
Stempel suggests computing a correlation coefficient of the / 
results of two coders who coded.the--·same.mate·a-ar:-- To cor-
rect for random errors likely in frequency tabulation, a con-
~~~n~y_taP.J~ould be test-run to determine coder --------
reliability. i5 
Different types of hypotheses can be tested with content analysis. 
They are: 
1) Propositions which state a relationship between (a) communi-
cator's environment, his opposition in the social structure, 
his personality traits, or his intentions, and (b) the kinds 
of signs which occur in his communications. 2) Propositions 
whichstate a relationship between (a).J;.h~ kind§..._£Lsl:~ 
~._g.c.c.ur. in commul}_tc:_~_!._fg_g_,__snd (b) t~I..~es.ti.:..<L~JL_q.f_ audi-
~!!...~ (such as changes in attitudes) which result from per-
ceiving those signs. 3) Propositions which state a 
relationship between one kind of sign in communications and 
another kind of sign which occurs in the same communicati?ns, 
such as typography.7 
This study was concerned only with the relationships between the 
kind of signs or symbols used by Time magazine in its coverage of the 
hostage crisis, but not with the reactions of audience, such as changes 
in attitudes. 
While doing the study, the writer did not take typography of sym-
bols into account. It is not important to the study because Time maga-
zine does not use banner headlines or special type faces for emphasis. 
~--.. ~--~------
Time magazine uses the same type for most of the printed matter. Italics 
were used only briefly for explaining photographs. 
At this stag~, the writer will describe the methodology adopted in 
her content analysis. The variables involved will be stated. The 
6Budd, Thorp, and Donohew, p. 67. 
7H. D. Lasswell, "The Analysis of Symbolic Content," The Compara-
tive Study of Symbols (Stanford, 1952), p. 29. 
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symbols will be named and the method of classifying them described. 
· The writer attempted to determine, through content analysis, the 
relation between several characteristics of symbols used by Time maga-
zine in its coverage of the hostage crisis in Iran. 
In symbols analysis, the writer attempted to detect and describe 
some attitude or attitudes (to be specified later). 2.Y.!!!b<:?J.~---~pat de-
in the content - articles in Time magazine dealing with the crisis and 
related to the period. 
The content of the articles were classified as "favorable", "unfa-
vorable" or "neutral" assertions. Each of the categories "favorable" or 
_.,_._ ... -~ ...... -
"unfavorable", was further differentiated into the sub-categories of 
"strength" and "morality", depending upon which of these standards was 
....___H"--~~~-- -------~ 
indicated in the favorable or unfavorable assertion. 
The symbols employed were chosen from Las~well: 
There is no cut-and-dried list of political symbols (and ob-
jects that will serve the needs of every research on politi-
cally significant contents of the press. We can, however, be l 
sure that comprehensive studies will include certain classes J 
of symbols: 1) o:l._persons, 2) Q..f....&.I.Q..U:QS, 3) _9.i .... ~8.~~~_!~, 
4) of policies, 5) of participants, and 6) of ideas (state-
ments of crimes, future expectations).S· ---
The question posed was: Did Time magazine use S~l)!~-- ~YI!l:Q<?~~_son-
' I 
cerning the American government - the Carter administration - in favor- 1 
I 
able light while the sa~: ... ?.~?~!'. __ ?. .. ~---s.._~bols were used concerning the 
Islam~hlic in __ unfavorable light? Or vice versa? What kind of 
attention was given to the hostages themselves? How often did Time 
magazine refer to the hostages or the issues? And in what direction -
8Harold D. Lasswell, "The Politically Significant Content of the 
Press, Coding Procedures," Journalism Quarterly (March 19, 1942), p. 12. 
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favorable or unfavorable? And what dimension - moral or immoral, 
strength or weakness? 
Operational Definition of Variables 
1. The Iranian Government and its leadership: Any reference to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranians, Khomeini, or representatives of 
the Iranian government. 
2. The American Government and its leadershfp: Any reference to 
the U.S. government, Americans, President Jimmy Carter, and other repre-
sentatives of his government. 
3. Favorable: Any reference to the parties in the crisis in 
po§~~~ye light. This is in relation to two sub-categories mentioned 
earlier - stren~l!!l!!. .. IDP...r.ali.t¥. 
4. Unfavorable: Any reference to the parties in the crisis in 
negative light. This again is in relation to two classes - strength and 
morality. 
Strength refers to the position of the symbol as a cause of value 
changes. It includes military, diplomatic, economical, and ideological 
assets and effectiveness. The morality standard relates to conformity 
or non-conformity of a symbol to norm. It includes the presentation of 
. 9 
symbols in terms of beauty, goodness, consistency and the like. 
Statement of the Problem 
The writer was concerned with the o~jectiv!!Y of Time magazine 
coverage of the hostage crisis. 
9Harold D. Lasswell, "The Comparative Study of Symbols," Hoover 
Institute Studies, p. 10. 
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The following questions were asked during the study of the news 
stories of the crisis published by Time: Which aspect of the Iranian 
..__:..,._. .._.....# ··--.. ~~ .. ~··"<·•··---·--,...,~-- J 
goJ~~~~~t did Time emphasize? Successes or failures? In what light 
--------
government portrayed in Time magazine's covera~ of,_th~. bC>§t~g-~_ .. c;rj._:eis? 
.,.- .... •·•••'"'"'~·· ""'"''-''·"""''"'·•·· ''"~~"'""_.. --~-•-••• ,,,~-··~e-~ _,_,.........,-. 
To which did Time direct more attention? The issues or the hostages? 
Key Symbols 
A list of symbols was compiled after carefully reading several arti-
cles related to the hostage crisis in Time magazine. 
Thirty symbols frequently repeated in the articles were noted. 
These were tabulated for analysis. 
sis: 
Stewart has emphasized the importanc;.e of symbols in content 9:~.?JY:: __ 
Studies content, as a r~le, attempt to report the relative at- j 
tention and the direction given these symbols at some time in 
some channel. As a gauge of the attention which symbols com-
mand, almost universal reliance has been placed on a single J 
dimension of content frequency.10 -----
The list of symbols chosen for analysis is as follows: 
1. Khomeini 8. Militant students 
2. Shah of Iran 9. Ghotbzadeh 
3. Moslem 10. Washington, D. c. 
4. Tehran 11. u.s. Embassy in Tehran 
5. Jimmy Carter 12. Kurt Waldheim 
6. Banisadar 13. Radio Tehran 
7. Hostages 14. Pars 
10Milton D. Stewart, "Importance in Content Analysis, A Variety Pro-
blem," Journalism Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1943) pp. 286-287. 
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15. Majlis 23. Shah's Wealth 
16. Rescue Mission 24. Panama 
17. American Public 25. Hostages' release 
18. Jody Powell 26. Demonstration in Tehran 
19. Hodding Carter II 27. Bakhtiar 
20. Anwar Sadat 28. u.s. Defense department 
21. Iranian demands 29. Hostage treatment 
22. Raja'i 30. Freezing Iranian assets 
It must be understood that more than 30 symbols have been frequent-
ly repeated in the articles in Time magazine. But for the purpose of I this analysis~ the writer chose those she believed to be prominent and 
important. 
· The writer read carefully through the articles in Time magazine 
from October, 1979 to February~ 1981. Occurrences were recorded as 
favorable~ unfavorable, or neutral to key symbols. 
While reading through the articles~ the symbols may not have oc-
curred with the same title or name, but unmistakably they comprised the 
point of reference. 
Coding Rules 
The following rules were followed for coding symbols: (a) Any city 
was coded as its country. Example, Tehran was coded Iran; (b) Any pub-
lie figure (or synonym for him) was coded as his country unless he was 
in the symbol code; (c) Any synonym for a country was coded as that 
country. Any synonym for a man was coded as the man. 
Certain rules were followed to classify strength and morality: 
---
1. Strength Plus: Ga~~~ act~ indication, promise, hope, 
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expectation, demands of: economic, military, diplomatic, social 
strength and/or gain. Diplomatic strength: envoy recall, demands for 
reparations, verbal attacks and offensives, belligerent stands, pro-war 
and anti-peace stands, threats. 
2. Weakness Minus: Loss of, act, indication, expectancy of weak-
ness or defeat in the military, economic, diplomatic, or social spheres. 
Economic weakness: lack of items constituting economic strengths de-
scribed above; need for aid, shortages. Diplomatic weakness: yielding 
to pressure, conciliatory attitudes, pro-peace, anti-war in face of 
threats. 
3. Morality Plus: Em~-~nal evaluat1~·o~n==s~o~f~t~h~e~s~yLm~b~o.l, endowing 
it with the following qualities: truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, 
propriety, religiosity, honor, generosity, kindness~ affection, sympathy, 
duty, justice, honesty, patriotism, loyalty, legality. 
4. Immorality Minus: Emotional evaluation of the symbol, endowing 
it with the following: falsity, viciousness, ferocity, uncharitableness, 
cowardice, impropriety, paganism, dishonor, selfishness, cruelty, hatred, 
vanity, treachery, treason, subversiveness, unjust, dishonesty, unpatri-
otism, disloyalty, illegality, aggressions, insanities, abnormalities. 
A form schedule for the analysis was prepared and applied for every 
article (a sample is enclosed). 
Articles were read for symbols. When a symbol was found, its pre-
dication was determined. For example, if the classification of the 
predication was "plus", according to strength, the symbol was entered in 
the +S column under symbol. If the predication was -S, according to 
strength, ~~=-~~~~r of sym~~~as placed in the -s column under the 
symbol. 
23 
The coded sheets were tabulated and the frequencies of each symbol 
in the schedule was tabulated by a simple counting operation. 
It must be noted here that a ~~lus" present:at£on of _t.h.L~bo~ put_ 
it :!:~ .... ~~-v~~~~ight an?~minus" presentation put2:!_ in an unfavor-
able light. 
---·····-······-·-·--·____.... 
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS 
This study centered entirely on relevant stories printed in Time 
magazine during the hostage crisis: November 1979 to January 1980. The 
stories were read as closely as possible, firs!__EEJ:!t'=i:.!:.._contents, and 
then for the presence or absence of 30 key symbols. For each symbol the / ------
(.
writer determined the direction (positive, neutral, or negative) and 
dimension (strength or morality). A "plus" presentation of the symbol 
.... 
put it in a favorable light, a "minus" presentation put it in an unfa-
vorable setting. 
Before going to the actual interpretation of the tables and data, 
the writer considered it necessary to explain briefly the time phases 
involved in the analysis. Instead of taking the crisis as one 15-month 
period, she chose to split the same into four phases. This enabled the 
identification of any change in the trend of events and their coverage 
by Time. 
Phase I (November 1979 to January 1980) 
Seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Shah's departure from 
U.S . to P·anama, and freezing of Iranian assets in the U.S. 
Phase II (February 1980 to April 1980) 
Shah leaves Panama for Egypt, U.S. cuts diplomatic ties with Iran, 
24 
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U.S. airborne force makes unsuccessful attempt to rescue hostages. 
Phase III (May 1980 to September 1981) 
Shah dies in Egypt of cancer and Majlis form a commission to study 
the fate of the hostages. 
Phase IV (November 1980 to January 1981) 
Iran proposes negotiations with U.S. to free hostages on basis of 
four conditions. Algerian mediators named. 
Table I shows the direction and dimension of symbols during each 
phase of the hostage crisis. 
The figures in Table I express, in percentages, the neutral symbols, 
symbols for positive and negative strength, and positive and negative 
morality. For example, in Phase I the percentages 8.98 and 14.69 are 
those for positive strength and morality for the American government. 
The total of 23.67 is the sum of percentages of positive symbols for the 
American government in Phase I. 
It must be noted that every figure is a percentage of the total num-
ber of symbols in that phase and not the entire crisis. For example, 
8.98 percent in Phase I for positive strength for the American govern~ 
ment means that 8.98 percent of the 205 symbols in that phase were of 
positive strength. 
Table I later is broken into four different tables for clearer dis-
course. 
Time magazine and its correspondents believed that the action of 
militant students in taking over the U.S. Embassy was totally immoral, 
improper, unjust, and illegal. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGES OF I.OTAL SXMBOI.S USED BY TIME MAGAZINE DURING FOUR PHASES 
OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS: CODED BY :QIRECTION AND DIMENSI~ 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
Phases s + M 0 s - M s + M 0 s -
I 8.98 14.69 8.16 4.49 15.10 4.89 6.94 
Total 23.67 8.57 12.65 19.99 7.75 27.75 
II 12.93 8.57 13.79 4.31 15.51 .86 6.03 
Total 21.55 14.65 18.1 16.37 8.62 20.68 
III 9.09 7.27 16.36 3.64 3.64 7.27 14.54 
Total 16.36 3.64 20.0 10.91 7. 2 7 41.81 
IV 13.75 23.75 16.25 6.25 6.25 1.25 6.25 
.. >-·--.., 
\ ',--· .... , 
Total //30 6.25 22.5 7.5) 6.25 20.-0 
-
---:.,/ 
----
.....__.-
S = Positive Strength M = Positive Morality 
0 = Neutral M = Negative Morality 
S = Negative Strength N = 496 Symbol Frequencies 
"' 
M Total 
20.11 
100 
14.65 
100 
27.27 
100 
13.75 
100 
N 
~ 
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The magazine's opinion can be found in paragraphs such as this: 
"The situation was most infuriating, because the mightiest power on 
earth found itself engaged in a test of wills with an unruly gang of 
Iranian students and an ailing zealot of. 79."1 "Thetrials presumably 
would be held before an Islamic revolutionary court. But compassion and 
mercy have scarcely been noticeable in Iran's revolutionary trials."2 
In the first phase, Time magazine, in its coverage, portrayed Iran 
20.41 percent in terms of negative morality and only ~?.2.__p~rcent in 
terms of positive morality, as shown in Table II. 
The figure 20.41, it must be remembered, stands for the percentage 
of negative morality symbols in the total of 205 symbols in the first 
phase. 
As for positive strength, the American government had 8.98 percent 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran had 15.10 percent. This high percent-
age on the Iranian side partly is because Iran held the upper hand in 
the situation. American government employees were being held hostage, 
the U.S. could make no attempt to rescue them, and no diplomatic nego-
tiations were successful. At one stage, Time magazine even conceded 
that negotiations with the Iranian governm~nt or Khomeini posed great 
problems. 
The Ayatollah Khomeini, old and ailing, does not understand 
modern statecraft, diplomacy, or administration. Yet this 
remarkable old man, and he alone, seems to possess the power 
to preserve his volatile country from total anarchy - and to 
free the rest of the American ho$tages in Tehran.3 
1"Iran: The Test of Wills," Time (Nov. 26, 1979), p. 20. 
2"Angry Attacks on America," Time (Nov. 26, 1979), p. 20. 
3"Iran: The Test of Wills," p. 20. 
1 
I 
s + 
Phase I 8.98 
Total 23.67 
TABLE II 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME 
MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
M 0 s M s + M 0 s --
14.69 8.16 4.49 15.10 4.89 6.94 
8.57 12.65 19.99 7.75 2~_.35 
M 
20.41 
Total 
100 
N 
00 
Another reason for the high percentage of strength is Time maga-
zine's portrayal of Khomeini. 
Khomeini as the "Man of the Year" for 1979. 
Wrote a Time correspondent about Khomeini: 
Khomeini's carefully cultivated air of mystic detachment 
cloaks an iron will, an inflexible devotion to the simple 
idea that he has preached for decades and a finely tuned 
instinct for articulating the passions and rages of his peo-
ple. He possesses the most awesome -and ominous of politi-
cal gifts: the ability to rouse millions to both adulation 
and fury.4· 
In the second phase (Table III), while the percentage of negative 
symbols for American government showed 4.31, the figure for Iran was 
14.65. 
The American government still felt that Iranian demands were un-
reasonable and the Iranian action in capturing the embassy was cruel. 
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A Time correspondent wrote in April, 1980: "But this was an unus-
ually somber Easter, and many a church-goer could not forget that half a 
world away, in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Americans had begun their 
sixth month of cruel captivity."5 
At the same time, the positive strength figure for the American 
...__--
government stood at 12.93 percent compared to 15.51 percent for Iran. 
A major reason for this was the failure of the rescue mission reflected 
in the magazine's coverage. "Nonetheless, a worldwide debate was raging 
over the incident. A Pentagon whose planes had not even been detected 
while flying into Iran, much less shot at, now was barraged by bombs of 
4ceorge Church, "The Mystic Who Lit the Fires of Hatred," Time 
(Jan. 7, 1980), pp. 9-10. 
S"Anger and Frustration," Time (April 14, 1980), p. 22. 
s + 
Phase II 12.93 
Total 21.55 
TABLE III 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME 
MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
M 0 s M s + M 0 s 
8.62 13.79 4.31 15 .51 .86 6.03 
14.65 18. 1 16.37 8 .• 62 20.68 
M 
14.65 
Total 
100 
w 
0 
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criticism. 6 
A look at the figures for positive morality (truth, mercy, glory, 
heroism, virtue) on either side proved to be interesting. The percent-
ages were 8.62 for the American government and only .86 for Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The mission was viewed as an heroic attempt by com-
mandoes to bring back their countrymen. 
At the same time the Iranian leaders were shown as condemning the 
attempt but at the same time unhappy for the dead. "This is proof of 
Carter's crime, ranted the Ayatulla Sadegh Khalkhali, formerly Tehran 
chief Islamic judge. Then switching hypocritically to mournful tones, 
he added: 'My heart aches for the families of these victims.' "7 
In the third phase, Time magazine continued to endow Iran with more 
negative morality, as shown in Table IV. When the new parliament, 
majlis, was sworn in, the magazine showed members to be radicals and 
revolutionaries. 
One article carried the headline, "Pistol-packin Parliament." 
Wrote a Time correspondent: "It was symptomatic of the country's 
volatile political climate that most of the 213 newly-elected represent-
atives arrived with personal body guards. Some even carried their own 
weapons."8 
The percentage for morality minus (falsity, impropriety, hatred, 
unjust aggressions) was 27.27, the highest yet encountered. Writing 
about the executions of anti-government officers, Time magazine implied 
6"Raging Debate Over the Desert Raid," Time (May 12, 1980), p. 32. 
7Ibid. 
8"Pistol-Packin' Parliament," Time (June 9, 1980), p. 41. 
Phase 
III 
Total 
s 
9.09 
+ 
16.36 
TABLE IV 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME 
MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
M 0 s M s + M 0 s 
7.27 16.36 3.64 3.64 7.27 14.54 
3.64 20.0 10.91 7.27 41.81 
M 
27.27 
.... 
Total 
100 
w 
N 
.. 
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the Iranians were violating the rules of their own religion. "Islamic 
guards fired salvo ofter salvo, enough to kill the men many times, while 
prison officials chanted a refrain of Allahu Akbar."9 
The Shah of Iran died in exile in Egypt. With his death Iranians 
lost one of their major demands - the return of the Shah. In this phase, 
both sides weakened in terms of positive strength. 
Carter stated he did not predict an early resolution of the issue. 
Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said "It would be a mistake to raise 
expectations based on any specific statement." 10 
The majlis were facing confusion in their midst. 
In the final phase, positive strength and morality for the American 
government rose rapidly as negotiations for the release of the hostages 
were proving to be successful. Khomeini, himself, seemed ready to solve 
the dilemma. For Iranians, the war with Iraq had become the overriding 
issue. 
The improvement in negotiations seemed to soften Time magazine's 
attitude toward Iran. Thus, this phase reflects the lowest percentage 
of negative morality. The figure for this period was only 13.75, as 
shown in Table V. The homecoming of the hostages, January 20, 1981, and 
their welcome by the American public were shown by Time magazine as 
gains in morality. This writer found that symbols like hostages, Ameri-
can public and hostage release appeared frequently and were endowed with 
morality plus (truth, mercy, glory, heroism, virtue, kindness, affection, 
patriotism). 
9"Nothing but Islam Will Do," Time (Sept. 29, 1980), p. 22. 
10"Mixed Signals from Iran," Time (Sept. 29, 1980), p. 22. 
Phase 
IV 
Total 
s 
13.75 
+ 
37.5 
TABLE V 
DIRECTION AND DIMENSION OF CODED CONTENT OF TIME 
MAGAZINE ON THE IRANIAN CRISIS 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
M 0 s M s + M 0 s 
23.75 16.25 6.25 6.25 1.25 6.25 
6.25 22.5 7.5 6.25 20.0 
M 
13.75 
Total 
100 
w 
.p. 
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Wrote a Time correspondent about the nation's welcome: "So the 
nation last week welcomed the freed hostages back from their 444 days of 
captivity with an orgy of emotion. Yellow ribbons were tied to virtu-
ally everything that could not or would not resist. 11 11 
At the same time, the figures for positive strength and morality on 
the Iranian side were 6.25 and 1.25, respectively. Iran no more held 
the upper hand. It had entered into negotiations and ultimately agreed 
to release the hostages. 
Time magazine did not pay much attention to what were certainly 
gains by Iran- ending of the U.S. embargo on trade with Iran and return 
of frozen Iranian assets. 
In Table VI, "favorable" figures were compiled from the presenta-
tion of the parties in positive light (+); and "unfavorable" from their 
presentation in negative light (-). 
The table shows there is a clear-cut direction in Time's coverage 
of the parties during the hostage crisis. 
This propositio~ - ~am~ly the clear-cut direction - is supported 
significantly in all the four phases of the crisis. 
In Phase I of the crisis, the figures for the Islamic Republic of 
Iran were 49 favorable and 67 unfavorable. For the American government 
it was 58 favorable and only 31 unfavorable. With 10.62, the chi square 
for Phase I in Table VI is .5957, and one can conclude that the differ-
ences could occur less than one time in 100 by chance. As indicated in 
the "C" column in Table VI, the coefficient of contingency of .5957 
shows a moderate relationship. Therefore in the first phase of the 
1111The Last Hurrah," T1"me (Feb 9 1981) p 12 
. ' ' . . 
TABLE VI 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF KEY SYMBOLS DURING EACH 
OF THE FQ~~S OF IRANIAN CRISIS* 
American Gov. 
Islamic Republic 
of Iran 
36 
Phase Fav. Unfav. Fav., Unfav·. df c 
Level, 
of Sig. 
......... ---
I 58 31. 49· 67 10.62 1 .5957 P< .0'1 
II 25 21 19 24 .92 1 .0970 NS 
III 9 11 6 23 3.31 1 .4275 NS 
IV 30 18 6 16 7.51 1 .6679 P<.01 
*Favorable and unfavorable presentation of American Government and 
Islamic Republic of Iran by Time magazine during each of four phases 
of Iranian Crisis, November 1979 to January 1981. 
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crisis Time magazine's coverage supports the proposition stated 
above. 
But in the second phase, the chi square of .92, shown in Table VI, 
indicates that there was no significant difference. Therefore, our 
proposition is not supported in this phase. 
In Phase III, the chi square of 3.31 shows there is no significant 
difference. Our proposition is not supported just as in the second 
phase. But in Phase IV, the difference is significant. The observed 
chi-square of 7:..~1-.S!...QJ.lld occur by chance less than o~---~~~~ _i.": 1_Q.Q.. 
Using the figures for favorable and unfavorable symbols in each 
individual phase, the writer ran one group chi-squares _!.o find out whe_!e 
~n J 
t~. This provided varied results. 
In Phase I the chi-square for 58 and 49 - being the favorable sym-
I bols for American and Iran- was .76. This is not significant. There-
fore, the two countries did not diffe_::__:i:n gett:!:!l$ f~vor-ab·le"'symbols. 
I 
But a look at the chi-square for unfavo~~h,-~-~---sY!!fugls in the same I 
phase shows a significant difference. For 31 and 67 - being the unfavor-
able symbols for the American and Iran - the chi-square was 13.22. This 
means the difference is significant. Therefore, Iran did get more un-
.... .,.,, ·.::;_~·~·:. ~ 
favorable c9verage in this phase than the U.S. - .......... . 
In Phase II, both the chi-square for favorable and unfavorable 
showed no significant difference. The figures were .818 for favorable 
and 0.2 for unfavorable. Therefore, in Phase II there is no significant 
difference. Neither the U.S. nor Iran received more favorable or unfa-
forable coverage. 
In Phase III, the coverage for favorable symbols showed no differ-
ence with a chi-square of .60, but the chi-square of 4.22 means Iran got 
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more unfavorable coverage than the U.S. 
In Phase IV, there was a significant difference in coverage of the 
two countries. The chi-square of 16 for favorable symbols of the two 
countries shows the difference. But the chi-square of .1176 for unfa-
oa::.-~--- ·~ ·- --·~"" ... ,, '-"''"--:.. 
vorable symbols shows no significant difference. This means the U.S. 
got more favorable coverage, while the two countries receiv!:2g_.l!l:l.~_''equal" 
-.;.::::::::.::=:-: .... ~-·-·· .. - ' ... ~
amount of~able references. 
Over-all Direction 
The over-all direction, or the general trend, can be inferred from 
-
Table VII. Of the total 413 assertions, 202 were favorable and 211 un-
favorable. Iran rec~ivefi.]l:Ote unfq.vorable American 
government received more favorable (122). Therefore, Time magazine's 
-
coverage of the hostage crisis did portray the Iranian government in 
_unfa~le ligh.t and the American government in favorable light. 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
Totals 
TABLE VII 
FREQUENCIES OF USE OF KEY STiffiOLS IN FAVORABLE AND 
. UNFAVORABLE" LIGHTS TOWARD TWO GOVERNMENTS: 
ACROSS ALL FOUR PHASES OF HOSTAGE CRISIS 
American 
122 
81 
203 
Islamic Republic 
of Iran 
80 
130 
210 
Totals 
202 
211 
413 
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Most of the references to the country and the people seemed to indi-
cate that Iran, especially Tehran, was full of mobs, demonstrations and 
confusion. Descriptions such as this by Time correspondents were common. 
A number of demonstrators wore the Kafan, the Islamic burial 
shroud, to proclaim their willingness to become martyrs. One 
group carried a large cardboard effigy of Carter, depicting 
him as Satan, with fangs, and scythe dripping blood.12 
Another example would be this: "The crowds around the U.S. embassy 
grew larger and uglier. 'Death to the Shah' the demonstrators chanted, 
'Death to Carter' ."13 
At the same time, references to the Carter administration, and 
Carter, himself, were usually favorable. Time magazine showed Carter 
trying to do his best most of the time. 
Two references are shown below: "For eight days the President had 
remained largely secluded in the White House, trying every weapon and 
maneuver he could imagine."14 
At the annual ceremony to light the Christmas·tree on the 
Ellipse behind the Wh.ite House, Carter bow~d to a request by 
the hostages' families: except for a bright star of hope at 
the top, he left the 24-ft. spruce dark as a somber 'vigil 
of remembrance.•lS 
A question we have to consider is this: How often did Time maga-
-~~·~ .... ___ ~~---•w~·----
zine refer to the hostages? And in what direction? Favorable or un-
'-.._ ---------··~·__.. .. ,.,.,,_.. ' ~-~ .......... _0"'~-N~~ .......... --
_, _________________ _____ 
favorable? And what dimension? Moral or immoral? Strength or weakness? 
Though the issue is known as the hostage crisis, very little was 
mentioned about the hostages. Their treatment and their families in the 
12"Angry Attacks on America," Time (Dec. 13, 1979), p. 28. 
13"Iran: The Test of Wills," Time (Nov. 26, 1979), p. 21 
14Ibid., p. 20. 
lSnA Somber Holiday Vigil," Time (Dec. 29, 1981), p. 32. 
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United States. This writer, while reading through the articles, found 
only occasional references to the hostages, but any mention made was 
~--·~--~-"'''~~,A--· 0 .,,,..,...,-~~--.----->- ,_,,' 0 ,__ '' • ~· ~- o'o~ <'•~>•"-~ ·-
~---·--
The dimension was always positive morality (glory, mercy, favorable. 
heroism, kindness, affection, sympathy). 
Wrote a Time correspondent at a time when the release of the host-
ages seemed near: 
Most of the families have tried to keep their hopes from ris-
ing too high. While the rest o.f the country concentrated on 
Election Night coverage on TV, the hostages' families were 
mainly attending to the ring of phone calls from Washington.l6 
16 "The Families: New Anxieties," Time (Nov. 17, 1980), p. 7 6. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The writer would like to present some words of caution before pro-
ceeding with the summary and conclusions. While reading through the 
articles, her judgment had to be used in classifying the symbols. Every 
effort was made - the writer being from Iran - to avoid any individual 
bias or prejudice. It is possible that if an American were !Q .. J::.o.nd-1:lct 
~-.. _ ___...__.-......... ~•'"''"'"~-· ' 
t~ ... ~-~~ analr_sis, results could be slightly different. 
Also, the writer did not conduct any reliab~lity checks. No other 
-·--- ~· ... ·---- ~--
coder apart from the writer was brought in to run any reliability test 
in coding symbols. 
Another caution concerns the credibility of the information and 
news sources used by Time. One has to remember that Time's bureau in 
Tehran lasted only until December 1979. ·The last two Time correspon-
dents to leave Iran were Bruce Van Voorst and Roland Flamini. 
In late December, the Iranian· government, accusing Time of "one-
..:::::-.::::.::. ___________ _ 
side~.an-~~~_£g~e, finally ordered the two expelled. 1 . 
After this, all the information received was through other foreign 
news agencies based in Iran, particularly in Tehran. 
From the findings, it is evident that Time's coverage was 
ltteyers, p. 1. 
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pro-American through much of the crisis. The writer is not surprised at 
this, since Time magazine is an American magazine. But what makes the 
con-writer unhappy is Time's hostile attitude toward Iran an~s, 
demning acts of religious leaders and portraying the entire: count!".Y. as 1 } --------- -----.-~---~"""''_" ____ , 
full of blood-thirsty revolutionaries . 
. _., ~-,.··~-- .. -~.-.- ----------
Time magazine ignored whatever happened in Tehran that was not re-
lated to the U.S. hostage crisis~ 'Though demonstrations and protests 
were covered, the "normality" in Tehran was ignored. 
----·---~- ·-· __ ._,..-.... .,.~.--.. ~----... ··------
Also, while updating the events in the crisis constantly, at no 
point was any detailed analysis made of ~~~ caused ~h~_JE?:!l~c:t.~ .. -E.~S?_P.J~ 
the responsibility of the medium to bring its readers up to the point 
at which the news story is and how this stage was arrived at. Only this 
can avoid a story being reported as_more than an isolated incident. 
The atrocit~, the crimes and the dictator - type rule of the Shah, 
--.... -------···-----·~"··....,..~···---· '1':'-·--~ .... - .............. ---~-~~-·e<·~----···----~ ''""''""''___ '-'-----~-----··-----~----
. and American int~!"-~eJ;:~~ce U:L.I.r:anian _g,J_f.~any years, contributed 
--· ...... ,..-- --·-- ......... ~ 
take over. The militants who took over the Embassy also believed that 
-----.-~----~----
the embassy officials wer~~gies~ 
Just as this writer knew from her own experience, the nature of 
the Shah's rule, there were many people in Iran who could have testified 
about the Shah's rule. This would have.provided another side of the 
I 
-........... -·. ----·-----" /' 
story. Time mag~:?:.~~-~~hou~~""~-=- ~.<:>?.:s~<:~ ~balanc: ie_ _ _t:he. PI~s~nta!J-9.!!.. ___ ~ I 
\l of news. 
--· ... --~---·'>·-·-·"""' __ __ 
The writer would like to reconunend that in reporting any future 
i~_:!"l1<:l.t~?.?.C3._1.~ such as this, Time magazine should take a 
43 
balanced stand. This would, perhaps, increase its credibility as a 
'""'"" ........... ""•>·~---,~----· ... ···-;·,·~·---~·~l>•o•••-•--V~•'•""'"~"•·~-----' 
.:~-~~_::~----~-~~:.!?~~dent ~aga~ comm?: tted to. ()"!Jj ~<::~-~'.f~Y. ___ It; .. should .. als.o .. _ 
~.£_~~-!_tlHL.faeJ..t..ngs of_~.!.l.t:J.re natioe, som~.t-~-~~-? ~hich :i,t .. ~-~-~m!ngJy __  
failed to do in the case of Iran. 
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SAMPLE OF CODING SHEET 
Date of Article 
Key 
Symbols 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
. 23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
"30. 
------------------
American-Government 
•- ,American Government 
+ 
s M 0 s M 
,. -·~ 
s 
Islamic Republic 
of Iran 
+ 
M 0 s M 
Key 
Symbols 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4·. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22· 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
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